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VII. FIRST CONTRACTS: 
CURRENT RESEARCH 
Union-Free Bargaining Strategies 
and First Contract Failures 
RICHARD W HURD 
Cornell University 
"I'll never do any goddamn business with a union." This was the reac-
tion of Reed Welch, owner of S&S Screw in Sparta, Tennessee, after the 
IAM won an NLRB election among 75 employees at his small factory on 
March 18, 1992. Welch then hired a new plant manager who negotiated 
with the IAM, reaching agreement on everything except economics. This 
was apparently too much for the owner, who fired the plant manager and 
disavowed the entire package. S&S Screw was ultimately held accountable 
by the NLRB for various ULP violations, including bad faith bargaining 
and discrimination against union members. But an order to bargain proved 
meaningless because support for the union had dissolved in the face of 
Welch's fury. With only nine supporters remaining, the IAM withdrew in 
December 1994. Cases like S&S Screw certainly seem to lend credence to 
those who attribute the high rate of first contract failures to illegal activity 
by employers. Unions, several academic studies, and the Dunlop Commis-
sion have traced the problem to bad faith surface bargaining. While admit-
ting that "mistakes get made," employers and their allies have challenged 
this conclusion, arguing that unrealistic union demands contribute to the 
difficulty of first contract negotiations and noting that hard bargaining by 
management is not a violation of the law. The objective of this paper is to 
investigate what happens during first contract negotiations, especially the 
unproductive ones that do not result in an agreement. Complete files were 
reviewed of 54 first contract cases collected by the AFL-CIO Industrial 
Union Department in 1993. Nineteen of these cases were updated during 
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1995 with follow-up interviews. Interpretation of the case studies was facil-
itated by a detailed analysis of 195 responses to a 1994 first contract survey 
conducted by the AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law. The original 
research was supplemented with a review of recent NLRB decisions on 
surface bargaining and hard bargaining. 
Employers' Union-Free Bargaining Strategies 
There are a variety of empirically valid explanations for the failure to 
achieve first contracts: plant closings, extended legal appeals of union elec-
tion wins, illegal surface bargaining by the employer, legal hard bargaining 
by the employer, and unproductive bargaining in spite of good faith negotia-
tions. As is documented more completely in a companion article, the root of 
the problem lies in employers' union avoidance objectives. Following initial 
certification of a union, approximately one-half of employers continue to 
look for ways to remain union free. Although not all succeed, the majority 
of these antiunion employers never sign a first contract. It turns out that the 
predominant route to union avoidance after a union NLRB election win is 
through carefully crafted negotiating strategies. Most of the rest of this 
paper relies on representative cases to illustrate different approaches to col-
lective bargaining followed by firms intent on avoiding a first contract. 
Technical Refusals to Bargain 
Employers who have decided to avoid dealing with the union by pursu-
ing legal appeals will eventually be forced either to negotiate or to refuse to 
bargain. Because decisions regarding unit determination and election con-
duct cannot be appealed beyond the NLRB, employers may refuse to bar-
gain in order to force a ULP case. Adverse ULP decisions can be appealed 
to the federal courts, giving the employer the opportunity to raise objec-
tions to the election. A 1992 letter from Clean Sweep Janitorial Services in 
Springfield, Illinois, to the SEIU after the company lost an election chal-
lenge describes this option: "Because we do not believe that the election 
results are a fair indicator of the support for [the union] among our em-
ployees, we are not prepared to bargain at this time. . . . We are informed 
that the only way this decision may be tested in the federal courts is by 
refusing your request for bargaining." 
Cases like New Frontier are referred to as technical refusals to bargain, 
since the objective is to challenge the election. These technical violations 
serve to delay bargaining indefinitely, creating a burden for the union 
which must struggle to maintain interest and support; the employer's 
union-free objectives are thereby enhanced. When the IBEW won a May 
1991 election to represent the workers at Tempco Electric Heater's Wood 
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Dale, Illinois, facility, the company complained that the workers were in-
timidated, coerced, and misled into voting for representation. After their 
election challenge was rejected, Tempco refused to bargain, forcing a ULP 
charge. The NLRB's automatic finding of a violation was appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit Court. The courts July 1993 decision noted that Tempco 
"has not even come close" to showing that workers were intimidated or 
coerced by the union and called the charges "far fetched." Though "far 
fetched," the company's refusal to bargain for two years while pursuing its 
appeal had accomplished its purpose. Negotiations never got off the 
ground, workers lost interest, the union was decertified, and the company's 
union-free status was preserved. 
Defiant Bargaining 
Some employers practice defiant bargaining; they openly violate the 
legal requirement to bargain in good faith, apparently based on their 
assessment that the benefits of remaining union free clearly outweigh the 
costs of noncompliance. The S&S Screw case described in the introduction 
is an example of this approach. Defiant bargaining is a viable option 
because the penalty for violating the duty to bargain in good faith is so 
weak. In most cases all the NLRB can do is order the company to resume 
negotiations, which may be futile. In December 1989 AFSCME won an 
election in a unit of blue-collar, clerical, and technical employees at Neu-
mann Medical Center in Philadelphia. Bargaining commenced on Febru-
ary 15, 1990, and over the next six months ten sessions were scheduled, but 
five were canceled by the hospital's attorney, Martin Sobol. He then 
informed the union that the hospital would not negotiate any further. 
Charges were filed, and eventually a settlement was accepted requiring 
Neumann to post a cease-and-desist notice and to resume negotiations. In 
direct violation of the settlement, the hospital continued to refuse to bar-
gain. The penalty was a second settlement reached March 31, 1991, which 
was identical to the first. One month later, Sobol notified AFSCME that 
the hospital was "in possession of objective considerations indicating that 
the union no longer represents a majority of employees" and that it was 
withdrawing recognition. The union filed charges, a trial was scheduled, 
and just prior to the hearing date the hospital entered into another settle-
ment agreement requiring it to bargain in good faith. In December 1995, 
six years after certification, there is still no contract. 
Evasive Bargaining 
Many employers and attorneys have eschewed blatant violations and 
have avoided reaching agreement on a first contract more artfully. One 
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common approach is to endeavor to comply with the law's requirement for 
good faith bargaining while evading resolution of essential issues. If suc-
cessful, evasive bargaining drags out the negotiating process, frustrates the 
union representative and the workers, and eventually results in decertifica-
tion. An example of an attorney who pushed this approach too far will help 
establish its outer bounds. 
Broad Reach Management in Falmouth, Massachusetts, retained the 
services of attorney Patrick Egan to represent the company in negotiations 
with SEIU Local 767, which had won a January 1992 election at Freedom 
Crest Nursing Home. Negotiations commenced in March, and the first six 
sessions held over four months were devoted to Egan's questioning about 
the meaning of virtually every word in the union s proposed contract. For 
example, Egan took issue with the term "workers," arguing that "employ-
ees" should be used. For a finding of surface bargaining, NLRB precedent 
requires scrutiny of the overall conduct of the employer. In this case, 
Broad Reach's administrator openly discussed with supervisors the plan to 
frustrate the bargaining process, solicited employees to circulate a decerti-
fication petition, and engaged in discriminatory actions against union sup-
porters. A finding of bad faith bargaining was based on Egan's conduct and 
the other violations. 
Two cases involving another lawyer help distinguish between accept-
able and marginally unacceptable evasive bargaining. Kelvin Berens (of 
Omaha, Nebraska) was retained by Shanefelter Industries in Uniontown, 
Pennsylvania, to represent the company in first contract negotiations with 
the UMWA, which had won an April 1991 election. Berens set an antago-
nistic tone, disparaging the union and leveling insults and personal attacks 
at union representatives. He also refused to meet frequently, and when 
bargaining sessions were held, he would read the newspaper while the 
union presented its proposals. The UMWA filed its first bad faith bargain-
ing charge in July 1991, but it was rejected. Berens continued to belittle 
the process, engaging in idle banter about cattle ranching, skiing, amuse-
ment parks—anything to kill time and prolong negotiations. Finally in May 
1992, the NLRB issued a complaint and scheduled a hearing. Shortly 
before the hearing date Shanefelter reached a settlement agreement; the 
company agreed to bargain in good faith and to refrain from "reading 
newspapers during collective bargaining meetings" and from "disparaging 
and belittiing union representatives." 
Subsequendy, Berens demeanor improved and he made concessions on 
a few noncontroversial items, but he offered no constructive proposals on 
economics, the grievance procedure, seniority, union security, dues check-
off, or other fundamental issues. He scheduled negotiations only when 
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pressed and then would meet two days in a month or three days in two 
months. Progress was delayed by his need to consult about union proposals 
with Shanefelter officials (they did not participate in negotiations). The 
union filed a series of bad faith bargaining charges between November 
1992 and the end of 1993 but in each case withdrew the charge under 
pressure from the NLRB regional office: "Always orally, [they] told us that 
meeting a couple of times every couple of months is not a refusal to bar-
gain . . . and the employer is not required to make any movement." 
A second case involving Berens reveals a slightly different tack. The 
UFCW won an election at Long Prairie Packing's St. Paul, Minnesota, 
plant in June 1991. The company took two months to decide on Berens as 
chief negotiator, and as at Shanefelter he sat at the table alone. This time 
he was cordial and cooperative, the epitome of politeness. He never re-
fused to meet, but he would postpone meetings. Negotiations centered 
around the unions proposals. Berens asked detailed questions about the 
union's intentions for each item. Progress was excruciatingly slow, and 
clauses were accepted only after "we dotted every i." Berens did not pre-
sent many proposals from the company. Whenever a matter came up 
related to plant operations he would defer agreement in order to check 
with the plant manager. As the months wore on, bargaining committee 
members became impatient and quit the team one by one. After a year 
with no substantive progress in sight, the UFCW lost a decertification vote 
by a two-to-one margin. 
Peremptory Bargaining 
The fourth union-free bargaining strategy is best described as -peremp-
tory bargaining. As with evasive bargaining, negotiating sessions are infre-
quent and there is no apparent interest in reaching agreement. Unlike eva-
sive bargaining, the employer presents unambiguous proposals. The 
objective is to adopt a non-negotiable position which is likely to be unac-
ceptable to the workers and/or the union. The rigidity often relates to some-
thing either essential to workers if independent representation is going to 
be meaningful or fundamental to the unions institutional objectives. Three 
cases will illustrate the dominant form of peremptory bargaining. 
At Dawn Frozen Foods in Crown Point, Indiana, the workers voted for 
representation by the BCTW in March 1991. The company retained attor-
ney Robert Bellamy to handle negotiations. Bargaining commenced in late 
June with sessions held only about once a month because of Bellamy's full 
calendar. On some issues the two sides reached accommodation, even 
agreeing to a wage increase which was implemented about six months into 
the talks. The company's position was unyielding on three clauses: Bellamy 
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absolutely refused to consider dues checkoff, union security, or plant visita-
tion rights for union representatives. 
After the union rejected the company's final offer in June 1992, the 
company implemented a strong antiunion campaign in the week preceding 
a decertification vote. On the day before the vote, Bellamy sent a letter to 
the BCTW, which was copied and distributed by supervisors to every 
worker. The conclusion was blunt: "If you do not believe me when I say 
that something is FINAL, go ask the UAW in Cambellsville, Kentucky. 
After I gave a final offer, they went on strike over an open shop clause . . . 
permanent replacements were hired, the union is now gone" (emphasis 
added). By narrowing the dispute to union security, dues checkoff, and 
access, Bellamy backed the union into a corner. Although of primary 
importance to unions, the centrality of these issues to effective representa-
tion is likely to be understood only by the most involved members. The 
BCTW was decertified. 
Two other cases involve employers' contract proposals which would 
effectively renounce any legitimate protection for workers on the job. 
Bethea Baptist Home in Darlington, South Carolina, retained attorney 
Julian Gignilliat to bargain with the UFCW after an August 1989 election. 
Gignilliat adopted an antagonistic stance, rejecting information requests 
and refusing to include provisions in the contract after agreeing to them 
verbally. More relevant to the current discussion, he was unyielding on sev-
eral proposals: employment-at-will language with no "just cause" provision; 
a two-step grievance procedure ending with the nursing home administra-
tor; an insistence on the employers right to discipline employees for off-
work activities; and an "integrity clause" allowing the employer to install 
hidden cameras, dyes, and powders to detect employee theft. Dues check-
off would be accepted only as a package with the employer's proposals for 
employment-at-will and the grievance process. 
In the Bethea case, ULP charges against the employer were eventually 
upheld by the NLRB in a January 1993 decision. A surface bargaining find-
ing was based on the "conduct in its totality," including not only the rigid 
positions but also Gignilliat's other actions and the employer's discrimina-
tory behavior away from the table. The parties resumed negotiations under 
the NLRB s order in March 1993, and Gignilliat withdrew some of the 
more onerous proposals, such as the integrity clause, but retained his insis-
tence on strong employment-at-will language and his opposition to just 
cause and grievance arbitration. Another year of negotiations produced no 
movement, and as of December 1995, negotiations were at a standstill. 
A similar case also involving Gignilliat helps to clarify acceptable 
peremptory bargaining. The IBEW won representation rights for a small 
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unit of workers at Coastal Electric Cooperative in Walterboro, South Car-
olina, in January 1990. This case was free of violations away from the table, 
and the only contested behavior was the employer's inflexible position on 
key issues. Bargaining did not begin until July, and there were only ten ses-
sions over the next eighteen months. The employers position on employ-
ment-at-will was clearly stated by Gignilliat in a letter to the IBEW nego-
tiator: "The co-op does not require the union's agreement to have 
employment-at-will. As far as this issue is concerned, the unions 'non-
agreement' is as good as its agreement." The other items in dispute were 
the employer's insistence on merit pay and its refusal to consider either just 
cause or grievance arbitration. 
Although an ALJ found that Coastal's inflexibility was evidence of sur-
face bargaining, the NLB.B overturned with specific reference to differ-
ences between this and the Bethea case. A June 1993 decision concluded 
that "the Respondent's various positions, although indicative of hard bar-
gaining, are not inherently unlawful, and its failure to make concessions, in 
the absence of other indicia of bad faith, is not a sufficient manifestation of 
bargaining with intent to avoid agreement." In reaching its decision, the 
NLRB noted explicitly that "management's reservation of authority was 
limited by whatever the parties agreed to elsewhere in their contract." Gig-
nilliat s implementation of the peremptory bargaining strategy at Coastal 
Electric clearly depicts the employer's union-free objective. A contract that 
preserves management-at-will, subject only to limitations elsewhere in the 
agreement, which omits just cause, codifies merit pay, and is subject to 
interpretation under a grievance procedure where the employer is the last 
step, creates a situation where (to rephrase Gignilliat) "the union's agree-
ment is as good as its nonagreement." The question for workers becomes, 
"Why have a union?" 
Analysis 
Although precise estimates of the extent of various union-free bargain-
ing strategies are not available, approximations are possible based on the 
first contract survey mentioned earlier. Nearly three-quarters of all first 
contract failures involve employer practices which fit into these categories. 
Technical refusals to bargain and defiant bargaining are present more than 
one-quarter of the time, while evasive bargaining and peremptory bargain-
ing are associated with nearly one-half of the failures. However, approxi-
mately one in three employers who initially attempt to avoid unionization 
after certification eventually sign a contract, often because the union has 
implemented countervailing strategies which force abandonment of union-
free objectives. 
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The unlawful surface bargaining often blamed for first contract failures 
seldom occurs independent of other violations. This can be traced to 
NLRB precedent which requires consideration of the totality of the 
employers conduct rather than only the behavior leading to a surface bar-
gaining charge. Thus most violations of the surface bargaining prohibition 
will be committed by employers who follow the defiant bargaining strategy. 
Any case of "pure" surface bargaining would be associated with evasive 
bargaining and/or peremptory bargaining strategies which cross the line 
into unlawful conduct. Reports from unions of surface bargaining in one-
third or more of first contract negotiations probably reflect a lay interpreta-
tion of the term and include lawful evasive and/or peremptory bargaining. 
The argument by some that first contract failures associated with bar-
gaining conduct are simply "mistakes" is not convincing. The bargaining 
patterns reported here are widespread, many cases involve experienced 
legal counsel, and the evidence points to deliberate attempts to avoid 
unionization rather than an unfortunate lack of familiarity with labor nego-
tiations. However, the other defense offered by employers for first contract 
failures, that lawful hard bargaining may be involved, is consistent with the 
evidence. Most of the employers who engage in peremptory bargaining are 
unlikely to experience adverse ULP decisions absent other violations. 
However, the implication that such a strategy is neutral is not convincing; 
more likely, employers engage in peremptory bargaining as part of a care-
fully crafted union avoidance policy. 
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